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rational interpretation of recent history. This and nothing else has hope for future welfare.

The truth is that there has never been a civilized or righteous or really free nation. No nation can be good or wise enough to stand as the superior over any other. All the belligerents under the pressure of war descended to the same level; all did what they abhorred in their enemies. Not to go into details, the enforcement of the allied blockade upon Germany for five months after the armistice was as ruthless, cruel, criminal and probably far more destructive of innocent life than anything which imperialistic Germany did in the war.

If there are superior persons in a nation, the harm that befalls them the moment they drop from the level of their humanity and take up the practise of violence, is greater than the harm that befalls the more barbarous or backward. If the more righteous use the barbarous means and seem to succeed, they are doomed eventually to all the more signal defeat. But the war proved, both in the story of how the nations went into it, and also in the false peace with which they concluded it, that all peoples are more alike than they are different. We have all alike been disappointed and humiliated. We could not make the world free or righteous or democratic by violating every ideal of freedom and justice and democracy.

Does this work out now into a system of lawlessness? Shall we give up governments? Shall we not try any longer to defend our lives and our rights? Shall we let burglars and murderers go at large? Shall we have no armed force to protect our shores from invasion? These questions are not so very difficult. Their answer is plain, as soon as we steer by our ideals and begin to obey the laws by which men normally live together.

What is government, not in the lurid glare of the cruel past, but in the light of our humanity? It is a grand system of co-operation, whereby we may so order our individuality and our social forces also as to procure for all of us not only the means of existence, but the best and freest conditions for the fulfillment of useful and happy lives. Looking this way, we contemplate no longer any privileged class or any criminal class. We aim at the common welfare, and we need the aid of every specially gifted man and woman in the community. We are beginning to see what a few able and humane men can do, even handicapped with the horrible old prison system, to change jails full of prisoners into hospitals and schools of hope. There is nothing so mighty in the world as good-will. What is more, the good-will of a single friendly man or woman is "catching"; every one feels its electrical pull.

We have been hypnotized to look the wrong way for our "dangerous people." We have expected to find them among the poor or the new immigrants. We have been afraid of socialists or anarchists or the I. W. W. They are no more dangerous than the people who persecute and lynch them. We look over seas to find dangerous nations. But other nations are like us; some of them think we are dangerous. The dangerous people are in Washington and New York and all over the land. They talk loudly of justice, and always mean justice for themselves; they want special privileges and tariffs; they

would send our boys to kill and be killed for the sake of oil concessions in Mexico or the Open Door in the East. The dangerous people may be in Congress, or judges, or bankers, or ministers, or labor leaders, or any of us, indeed, who think of justice as something to be forced upon others, and wrested from others, and never see that justice is something cheerfully given to every one. Justice is the good manners of humanity.

Finally, we must stop looking the wrong way for protection from violence. The United States so far has spent most of its billions of money to meet violence with violence, as Rome did, as Germany and England did. Every great fort was a scowl, every battleship was a frown, directed to our neighbors.

A group of powerful people conceived a League to Enforce Peace. The very name carried a threat. These able men did not understand the human nature of a threat. The threat is the preparation against mischief and disobedience. To threaten is to expect and invite and almost compel the violent spirit. It is the voice of the superior or stronger asserting itself over the weaker. Thus, for years we have used the threatening tone toward Mexico. We have made our Monroe Doctrine an instrument of fear to all the peoples south of us.

It is time now to look the opposite way for security. Suppose we invest the cost of a single warship in planting a school in every province of Mexico; suppose we treat the Japanese and every other people as we like to be treated; suppose we construct a veritable commonwealth of nations, not built on force, but on the common humanity. Where is the people whom we should need to fear or threaten?

## CLEARING THE WAYS FOR THE GREAT CONFERENCE

One month and one day after the State Department announced that President Harding had informally invited the powers to a conference on disarmament and the problems of the Far East, the State Department made public the texts of the formal invitations sent out. The conference had become an assured thing, and the statesmen and the peoples of the world were turning their thoughts upon it, eagerly and hopefully.

Hatreds and jealousies growing out of the war, and the bitter and prolonged contending over the terms and conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, gave way among most peoples to a new dream of that new order so long sought and so long deferred. It seemed that a fresh start was to be made, and the circumstances attending the preparations for the start seemed to many, as journals of all affiliations showed, happy and auspicious. A deep conviction was abroad, when the formal invitations were issued, that there was a vast intangible power at work that would not permit defeat of the great project.

Identical invitations were sent to Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. They read:

The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response to his suggestion that there should be a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions should also be discussed.

Productive labor is staggering under an economic burden too heavy to be borne unless the present vast public expenditures are greatly reduced. It is idle to look for stability, or

the assurance of social justice, or the security of peace, while wasteful and unproductive outlays deprive effort of its just reward and defeat the reasonable expectation of progress. The enormous disbursements in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity; and avoidable or extravagant expense of this nature is not only without economic justification, but is a constant menace to the peace of the world rather than an assurance of its preservation. Yet there would seem to be no ground to expect the halting of these increasing outlays unless the powers most largely concerned find a satisfactory basis for an agreement to effect their limitation. The time is believed to be opportune for these powers to approach this subject directly and in conference; and while, in the discussion of limitation of armament, the question of naval armament may naturally have first place, it has been thought best not to exclude questions pertaining to other armament to the end that all practicable measures of relief may have appropriate consideration. It may also be found advisable to formulate proposals by which in the interest of immunity the use of new agencies of warfare may be suitably controlled.

It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final assurance of the peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove cause of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to the principles and their application. It is the earnest wish of this Government that, through an interchange of views with the facilities afforded by a conference, it may be possible to find a solution of Pacific and Far Eastern problems of unquestioned importance at this time, that is, such common understandings with respect to matters which have been and are of international concern as may serve to promote enduring friendship among our peoples.

It is not the purpose of this Government to attempt to define the scope of the discussion in relation to the Pacific and Far East, but rather to leave this to be the subject of suggestions to be exchanged before the meeting of the conference in the expectation that the spirit of friendship and a cordial appreciation of the importance of the elimination of sources of controversy will govern the final decision.

Accordingly, in pursuance of the proposal which has been made, and in the light of the gracious indication of its acceptance, the President invites the Government of (naming the power) to participate in a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions will also be discussed, to be held in Washington on the 11th day of November, 1921.

The invitation to China is the same as the others, except that the second paragraph of the others, dealing with the burden of armaments, is eliminated, and that in the last paragraph China is asked to participate "in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions."

In the month since President Harding caused announcement to be made of his plans for a conference on disarmament and the problems of the Pacific and the Far East, very substantial progress has been made in clearing the ground for the work to be done. The larger difficulty in the way was the fear evident in Japan that extension of the deliberations of the conference to Pacific and Far Eastern questions augured no good for her ambitions, but Secretary Hughes was able to allay that fear finally, aided by the influence of the liberal elements in Japan.

On July 27, nearly three weeks after the announcement of the President's plan, and after several conferences between the Secretary and Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, the State Department was able to give out the following statement as to formal exchange between the two governments:

The Department of State today made the following statement with regard to the proposed conference in Washington

on the limitation of armaments, which will also embrace the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions:

Upon the President's announcement of the plan Great Britain, France, and Italy expressed their approval and their readiness to receive the proposed invitation.

Japan expressed its willingness to accept an invitation to the conference on the limitation of armament, but desired to be advised as to the scope and nature of the subjects to be discussed in connection with Pacific and Far Eastern matters. After conversations between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, the *Chargé d'Affaires* of the American Embassy at Tokio delivered, on July 23, 1921, the following memorandum to the Imperial Government:

"The Government of the United States deeply appreciates the readiness of the Imperial Japanese Government to accept the invitation to attend the conference on the limitation of armaments.

"The Secretary of State of the United States in the course of informal conversations with his Excellency, the Imperial Japanese Ambassador at Washington, has expressed the hope that the Imperial Government would not press its inquiry as to the nature and scope of the Pacific and Far Eastern problems to be discussed at the proposed conference, in view of the fact that it is desirable that the full acceptance of the invitation of the American Government leave the matter open for adjustment in the precise agenda to be arrived at later.

"The Secretary of State is willing to proceed with exchanges of opinion regarding the agenda prior to the meeting of the conference. He considers it inadvisable, however, at the present moment, to hamper the program and in particular to delay the arrangements for the conference pending an agreement regarding this matter."

Today the Department of State has received, through the American Embassy at Tokio, the following reply:

"The Japanese Government have taken note of the contents of the American memorandum of July 23, received through the American *Chargé d'Affaires*, in reply to the Japanese memorandum of July 13, on the subject of a conference on the limitation of armaments to be held at Washington.

"It has been brought to the knowledge of the Japanese Government that the Government of the United States is willing to proceed with exchanges of opinion regarding the agenda prior to the meeting of the conference, and that it considers it advisable to adjust in that agenda the nature and scope of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions to be discussed at the proposed conference. The Japanese Government, on that understanding, are, happily, to be able to inform the American Government that it is their intention gladly to accept an invitation for a conference which shall embrace the discussion of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions.

"The Japanese Government have been made aware, through the communications and the published statement of the American Government and the conversations between the Secretary of State and Baron Shidehara, that the propositions of the American Government to discuss the Pacific and Far Eastern problems is based on the close bearing they have on the question of the limitation of armaments, which is the original and principal aim of the conference, and that therefore the main object of discussing these problems is to reach a common understanding in regard to general principles and policies in the Pacific and the Far East. Desiring, as they do, to contribute to the establishment of an enduring peace and to the advancement of human welfare, the Japanese Government earnestly hope that the proposed conference may attain the expected results, and their ideals may therefore be brought nearer to realization.

"In order to insure the success of the conference, the Japanese Government deem it advisable that the agenda thereof should be arranged in accordance with the main object of the discussions as above defined, and that introduction therein of problems such as are of sole concern to certain particular powers or such matters that may be regarded accomplished facts should be scrupulously avoided."

According to the President's announcement, China will be

invited to participate in the discussion of Far Eastern questions and has indicated her willingness to accept the invitation. Other powers having interests in the Far East may also be invited to take part in that discussion. Formal invitations have not yet been issued, and the details of the arrangements are being perfected.

Certain practical difficulties are foreseen in some quarters, in the last paragraph of the Japanese note, wherein the opinion is expressed that matters that are the concern of particular powers, or matters that may be regarded as accomplished facts, should be avoided in the conference. It is understood by some that the "accomplished facts" referred to in the Japanese note have to do with Yap, Shantung, and other areas in the East, regarding which there has been difference of opinion between Japan and this country or other Western nations.

A Tokio dispatch of July 21, six days before the publication by the State Department of the exchange of notes, stated that Tokio papers reported the Japanese Cabinet as holding that the questions as to Shantung and Yap were settled at Paris. It was indicated that Foreign Minister Uchida held that view. On the other hand, at the same time, officials in Washington expressed the opinion privately that neither Yap nor Shantung was a closed question. They held that as the United States had not concurred in the mandate to Japan over the islands of which Yap is one, there was little question that the majority of the powers would consider the question of disposition of that island open. And, as to Shantung, since China, from which Germany took Shantung, had never consented to the action of Paris, turning the territory over to Japan, officials held that question to be open, too.

There were signs during the discussion that Japan would endeavor to bring the settlement of such questions as Yap and Shantung to a head before the conference met, and it was understood that the State Department at Washington was entirely willing that that should be done, provided, of course, the final disposition was in accord with the views of the department. Whether or not that is accomplished before the conference meets, a distinctly optimistic feeling prevails that Yap and Shantung, and other Eastern points of controversy, more or less similar, will not be allowed to endanger the conference seriously. The feeling is strong that Secretary Hughes' tact, the impression he has made upon diplomats in Washington as seeking the fair and durable basis of agreement, and the belief among many of the most enlightened people of Japan that the United States has no aggressive designs against their country, will go far toward eliminating whatever doubts Japan may have about the sincerity of the whole conference move.

That belief in the honest purpose of the United States among the enlightened of Japan has been illustrated, since Mr. Harding made his move, by frequent official and unofficial expressions in Japan. Against the pessimistic mutterings of the *Kokumin*, organ of the militarists, that Japan will be put in the position at the conference of a defendant, and that Anglo-American pressure threatens the Far East, there are numerous statements sent by cable from Tokio, such as this from Premier Hara, given to B. W. Fleisher and cabled to the *New York Evening Post*:

I am more optimistic than ever as to the good relationship between the United States and Japan. I have never believed that there has been any danger of war between the United States and Japan. If there is any one who insists there is

such a danger, he is the one whom we, both the Americans and the Japanese, have to beware of. There is no question between Japan and America that can be settled by war and that cannot be settled by diplomacy and settled honorably to both parties.

Japan's early history as a world power was one of good relationships with the United States, one of justice and benevolence on the part of the United States. The first treaty of equality was initiated by the United States, and that good relationship existed until thirty years ago. The modern Japan was born with kindly feelings toward America. There is no reason why those feelings should have changed; we are ready to return to them.

When I visited the United States twelve years ago I then was asked when there was going to be war between the two nations. There are persons who still are asking the same question. It is about time we should at least attempt to settle all our pending questions and dispel the many misunderstandings. There are but two powers facing the Pacific today—the United States and Japan. There is plenty of room on the Pacific for both of us, and more.

Moreover, there appears to be a growing understanding among the liberal element in Japan, whether in official life or not, that there is soundness in the view of the Washington administration that the Far Eastern problems are inseparably linked with the disarmament question, especially the naval aspect of that question. Those liberal elements, fighting for relief from the tremendous burdens that the big armament program puts upon the people of Japan, seem to be much more disposed to accept consideration of the Eastern questions as a proper function of the conference, since discussion of the whole subject has directed attention to the direct relations between the Pacific and the armament question.

This relation seems to be clearly understood in England. In a late issue, the *Sunday Times* (London) gave expression to a thought that appears frequently in British journals, when it said, of the necessity for treatment of the whole Pacific problem:

China is the greatest of the world's neutral markets, and there is no putting bounds to the magnitude of its future expansion with its teeming industrious population. With its vast stores of mineral wealth, China is capable, if statesmanship does not prevent it, of providing as many subjects for war as Turkey and the Near East have done.

One would like to see the conference lay down a new Monroe Doctrine in regard to her. By this doctrine interested powers would bind themselves to seek no territorial acquisitions at her expense, and, further, would lay down the principle that whatever territorial or political changes do take place they are not to interfere with the principle of equal commercial opportunity for all powers in her markets.

It is to be hoped that the conference will set its face sternly against any division of China into spheres of influence, political or commercial. From Peking to Canton there must be one industrial rule for all powers, equality of opportunity for all the nations, with no closed markets, no preferential rights of any kind.

Great Britain and the United States have steadily pursued this policy, and though the record of Japan is not so good, she is committed to the principle and the conference should have no difficulty in tightening up the loose screws in the Anglo-Japanese agreement.

Of less importance than the problem of persuading Japan to enter the conference wholeheartedly, with the Pacific problems to be discussed, have been such problems as that put forward with respect to a preliminary parley, favored by Premier Hughes, of Australia, and other statesmen of the British Empire, and that raised by some of those who were afraid that there would be dangerous conflict between

the Harding conference and the work of the Disarmament Commission of the League of Nations. With respect to the idea of a preliminary parley, the influence of the Harding administration seems to have been exerted against it without causing embarrassment. With respect to the danger of conflict with the League of Nations, various spokesmen for the latter have said that none need be feared. At the opening session of the League's Disarmament Commission in Paris, M. Viviani said:

We were not surprised that the Chief of the great American nation, so powerful and so generous, which by its thinkers and in civic movements has so often agitated the question of disarmament, has taken the step which France first approved—of assembling governments with a view to an agreement on disarmament. We are happy to be associated with this initiative, confident that the work we are undertaking cannot fail to be taken into consideration.

The question of disarmament is so difficult, so complex, and so delicate that those who approach it meet ignorance, prejudices, and traditions in both military and economic fields, so that there cannot be too many men trying to solve the problem. Such is the spirit in which we work, for it will not have been worth while to have carried the burden of the great war if we cannot derive from it benefits for our children.

## SURCEASE OF BLOODSHED IN IRELAND

"This has been the quietest week-end in Irish annals since January, 1919, when the extremist Sinn Fein campaign began."

Those words appeared in a dispatch from London in the latter part of July. Similar statements could have been made after each subsequent week-end up to the time of going to press. Therein is to be found a fact of large importance to the civilized world, horrified these many months at the regularly recurring slaughters, first of the partisans on one side and then of the partisans on the other, in the latest outbreak of the centuries-old feud.

More than that, the existence of a state of peace, temporary though it has been, has created a mental attitude on each side that augurs most happily for final settlement of the Irish problem. Once the insanity of the terrible killings was suspended, reason assumed the throne in each camp, and men and women began to ask each other, with increasing insistence, why the problem could not be settled by sane processes—by sensible methods of give and take. As they asked, they answered more and more positively that it could be.

Not that there have not been foolish firebrands on both sides, carelessly dealing with the lives of many men and the happiness and welfare of many more, while Mr. Lloyd-George and Mr. de Valera, with their respective associates, were in conference. There have been such. Utterly criminal utterances have appeared in England and in Ireland from extremists; and it is significant that most of these extremists appear to be persons like those whom a gallant Confederate soldier, pleading for the healing of sectional wounds in this country, once described as "invisible in war; invincible in peace."

From the Tory party in England a delegation was formed which waited on Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Tory leader, during the negotiations, with a demand that in any settlement Ulster be untouched. The delegation is said to have departed "only half satisfied" with Mr. Chamberlain's assurance that Ulster would not be "coerced." And in the House

of Lords the leader of the Conservative extremists, Lord Salisbury, stated that his element "felt deeply the shame and humiliation involved in the Irish negotiations."

On the other side, the *Irish Bulletin* allowed itself to be led, by what it regarded as unsatisfactory statements in the British press, to print a rather truculent article, in which it said that "the Irish people have their own views of what offers are reasonable, and, notwithstanding threats of renewed terror, will agree to nothing which denies the ancient unity of Ireland or seeks to impose upon the nation alien dominion of any kind"; to which was added that "the Irish people have made up their minds that they will accept a peace which is just, and does not betray the dead and living, but they will return to the wilderness of hardship, suffering, and death before they will compromise in the slightest degree their national honor." All that and more of bellicose utterance in the hour when calm words across the conference table were sought by reasonable men.

But the work of making peace in Ireland has moved ahead fairly steadily since Mr. Lloyd-George and Mr. de Valera sat down in 10 Downing Street, at 4.30 on the afternoon of July 14, and talked until 7, having tea during the conversation, the equivalent of the significant thing in this country of "breaking bread." Mr. de Valera described that meeting as an effort to see what could be done at close quarters, and refrained from any general comment, while Mr. Lloyd-George later expressed the earnest hope that the opportunity for peace would not be lost. The conversations continued until July 21, with Sir James Craig, Ulster leader, in conference with British leaders. On that date Mr. Lloyd-George handed Mr. de Valera the British preliminary proposals, and the Irish chieftain was described as leaving Downing Street in cheerful mood.

Exactly what those proposals were was not made known, although it was stated that they were not the final terms of the British, but were to be used as the basis for discussion by Mr. de Valera in counseling with the other Sinn Fein leaders. Various guesses, of more or less confident tenor, were offered. The one oftenest made was that Dominion government, similar to that enjoyed by Canada, was proposed, with safeguards for Ulster against oppression by South Ireland, possibly in the form of a separate parliamentary system for Ulster, but with a way left open for the easy unification of all Ireland in one practically independent, self-governing State in the "commonwealth of British nations." Linked with the reports of this plan were provisions that Great Britain would control the military and naval relations of Ireland, and that liberal fiscal policies would be set up in Ireland's relation, as a self-governing Dominion, to England.

Another guess as to the British offer was that it provided four parliaments in Ireland—in Ulster, Munster, Connaught, and Leinster—with one national parliament. Still another guess was that it was proposed to have an Ulster and a South Ireland parliament, each handling the local affairs of its respective district, with a national parliament, fashioned after the Congress of the United States. The lower house of the national parliament, as this guess had it, would be elected on a numerical basis, while the upper house would have equal representation from South Ireland and Ulster, following the principle under which each of the American States is given two members of the United States Senate.